Classes of two-person zero-sum games termed "equivalent games" are defined. These are games with identical value and identical optimal mixed-strategies but with different matrix entries and thus different opportunities for exploiting a nonrational opponent. An experiment was conducted to investigate the strategy-choice behavior of subjects playing pairs of these "equivalent games." Also investigated was the extent to which subjects would exploit a programmed stooge as a function of the degree to which the stooge departed from his optimal strategy mix. The results indicated that subjects learned to exploit the nonrational play of the stooge opponent. The game factor, on the other hand, seemed to have no significant effect upon the strategy-choice behavior of the players. The implications of these results are discussed in light of questions raised by previous research on decision-making in 2 x 2 zero-sum games.
against programmed stooges is similar or different in pairs of such games. In particular, we wish to determine the ability of human decision makers to learn to exploit their opponents' departures from the rationally prescribed strategy-choice in zero-sum games without saddle points. This ability will be examined in relationship to two factors: one, the extent to which such exploitation produces payoffs greater than the value of the game; and two, in terms of the magnitude of an opponent's departure [514] from his optimal strategy choice mix. (Row's optimal strategy choice in a zero-sum game without a saddle point is defined as the probability mixture of pure strategies which gives him his largest guaranteed expected return, given that he has no information concerning his opponent's strategy choices. This guaranteed expected return to Row is called the value of the game. The optimal mixed strategy for Column is similarly defined.) Equivalent games, which are used in the present paper, are games having identical value and identical optimal mixed strategies but which have different entries in their payoff matrices. Such games allow one to vary the degree to which a player is rewarded for exploiting a nonrational opponent while keeping value and optimal strategy mix constant.
By using equivalent games and programmed stooge strategies, the effects of magnitude of reward for exploitation of the other and magnitude of the opponent's departure from his optimal strategy can be systematically studied.
Studies dealing with these effects are not reported in the literature on experimental gaming. Instead, previous studies on decision-making in two-person zero-sum games have addressed themselves to the questions of whether subjects can learn to play the strategy containing the saddle point in games which have them, or learn to play their optimal mixed strategy in zero-sum games without saddle points.
Thus for example, in a study by Morin (1960) , 28 male subjects played a variety of two-person zero-sum games with saddle points against a stooge opponent who always selected his optimal strategy. It was found that, while subjects tended to make fewer nonoptimal strategy choices over time, there was still a significant number of nonoptimal strategy choices made. Subjects also seemed unable to analyze the strategic characteristics of the games by considering the viewpoint of their opponent and so were not able to effectively find their own best strategy choice.
In a paper addressed to the same question, Lieberman (1960) As in the case of zero-sum games with saddle points, the relatively few studies which have been conducted on zero-sum games without saddle points also deal with the degree to which players succeed in finding the optimal strategy choice or, in this case, the optimal strategy-choice mixture. Kaufman and Becker (1961) used five different zero-sum payoff matrices, all having the same value, to study the strategy choice behavior of naive subjects in games without saddle points. The study explored the questions of whether subjects learn, by playing, to make optimal strategy choices, and whether games with the same value, but calling for different optimal strategy mixes, produce differences in the players' performances. Twenty subjects played, each against the experimenter, who, given the subject's strategy, selected a counter-strategy that kept the subject's earnings at or below the value of the game. In the event that the subject chose the optimal strategy mix, the experimenter responded with his own minimax counter-strategy. If In a more recent study, Messick (1967) evaluated the performance of subjects playing a 3 x 3 zero-sum game without saddle point. The experiment was designed to assess the subjects' performance against that of a programmed opponent who used one of the three different strategies: (a) minimax strategy; (b) a maximization-of-expected-value model with a complete memory of the subjects' past choices; (c) a maximization-ofexpected-value model with a limited memory of the subjects' past choices. Fourteen subjects were assigned to each of 3 different opponent conditions and each subject played 150 repeated trials.
The results for this study are reported in terms of money earned by the player. Against the minimax opponent, subjects' earnings were not significantly different from the value of the game. On the other hand, subjects earned much more than the value of the game when playing against either of the two expected value-maximizing strategies. And they [517] did significantly better against the model with limited memory, compared to the one with complete memory.
A study by Fox (1972) 1-y) and (x, 1-x), respectively-and (iii) the value of the game (z), and solving for the entries (a,b,c,d) in the payoff matrix. The generalized 2 x 2 zero-sum game to which we refer is shown below as Game 1.
The minimax strategies of both players may be expressed in terms of the several entries of the game payoff matrix (Rapoport, 1966 The counter-strategy function provides a fourth parameter for 2 x 2 zero-sum games without saddle points. Of course the payoffs themselves, a, b, c, and d constitute a 4-parameter specification of such games, but each of them individually is not particularly meaningful. More meaningful are x, y, and z, the optimal strategy mixtures for the two players and the value of the game. In addition to x, y, and z, a fourth parameter is needed to fully specify a game.
Referring to the counter-strategy function, we see that it is linear with slope:
This slope is a measure of how much can be gained through "exploitation" of the nonoptimal play of the opponent by row per unit of change in his strategy mixture. Let us call this quantity the "opportunity rate" for row, the subject, and imagine k to be controlled by the experimenter through a stooge. Then the experimenter's "control of the opportunity rate"-that is, the change in opportunity rate per unit of change in stooge strategy mixture-is a -b -c + d.
Formally, simply define w by:
Solving equations 1, 2, 5, and [a] for a, b, c, and d in terms of w, x, y, and z yields: [520] shown that z' = rz + s. Figure 1 . (1) Game 2, opponent departing relatively moderately from his minimax strategy (G2M).
(2) Game 2, relatively large opponent's departure from minimax (G2L).
(3) Game 4, moderate departure from minimax (G4M). (4) Game 4, large departure from minimax (G4L). In the &dquo;moderate departure&dquo; conditions, the computer assigned a probability of .6 to its al choice; in the two &dquo;large departure&dquo; conditions, p(aI ) -.7. Subjects' opportunities for exploiting their opponents' departures from rational play in the several conditions are summarized in Figure 1 (Game 4 is substituted for Game 3).
Our experiment may, therefore, be described as a 2 x 2 x repeated measures design (in which trials are blocked in units of twenty) where game and opponent's strategy are between-subject factors.
Results
The presentation of the results of the experiment will be divided into three sections. First, we shall show how the intended experimental manipulations were in fact realized. Second, we shall examine data on the performance of subjects in the several experimental conditions as they [525] relate to the two between-subjects factors and time. Last, we shall consider the relevance of our data to two questions that have been raised in the literature on zero-sum games:
(1) Do subjects show evidence of learning nonrational counterstrategies in zero-sum games?
(2) Do random fluctuations in a stooge's strategy-choice behavior (around some fixed mixed strategy) influence the choice behavior of experimental subjects?
VERIFYING THE EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS
For the manipulation associated with each of the experimental conditions to be successful, it is necessary that the programmed stooge play his assigned mixed strategy. The random numbers used by the program and the choices generated from these numbers were checked for apparent randomness before the experiment was run, following the methods described in Naylor et al. (1966) .
To verify that the relationship between subject strategy (i.e., proportion of b choices) and payoffs were consistent with our intentions, we regressed the actual earnings of subjects in twenty-trial blocks on their proportion of b choices (again, in twenty-trial blocks) for each of the experimental conditions. Expected regression coefficients are computed from equation 10 and (substituting Game 4 for Game 3) describe the lines that appear in Figure 1 . Results of the regression analyses are presented in Table 1 . Since the experimental manipulation apparently failed in one of the conditions, yet was successful in the other three,4 we are faced with a choice between alternative data-analysis strategies: (a) we might proceed with the analysis as originally planned; or (b) we could discard data for G4M subjects and analyze only data for the remaining three groups. Viewing these alternative approaches in terms of experimental designs, the &dquo;traditional&dquo; main effects and interaction effects analysis we originally intended implies the set of contrasts whose coefficients appear in part A of Table 2 . If we eliminate the G4M group, we are left with two degrees of freedom among the three remaining groups. Since the primary question we wish to ask of our data concerns subjects' ability to differentiate &dquo;equivalent&dquo; games, one degree of freedom could be used to compare the G2L with the G4L group. We could then (partially) address the question of the impact of stooge strategy by comparing the G2M group to the G2L and G4L groups (see part B of Table 2 ).
We shall, in fact, combine these alternative analysis strategies in the following manner: first, we shall make descriptive comparisons implied by the set of contrasts in part B of Table 2 , and then examine the behavior of G4M group subjects to determine whether their performance diverges from that of subjects in the other groups; finally, we shall let the results of our descriptive analysis govern our decision concerning the disposition of data from the G4M group. [529] ~ ~ F igure 3.
TWO QUESTIONS POSED IN PREVIOUS RESEARCH
In this section, we shall consider how the results from our experiment relate to two questions posed in earlier experimental literature on zero-sum games:
(1) Can subjects learn to increasingly take advantage of an opponent's nonrational strategy-choice behavior (see Fox, 1972) ? (2) Are subjects responsive to random fluctuations in their opponent's sequence of choices (see Fox, 1972; Lieberman, 1962)? (1962) has advanced the hypothesis that subjects respond to random fluctuations in a stooge's play when the stooge follows some mixed strategy. Fox (1972) found some, although weak, support for Lieberman's hypothesis.
To assess, in the present study, the dependence of subject behavior on variations in the stooge's play, we look separately at subjects playing against the M and L stooge strategies. Since there was no significant effect of the game factor, G2L and G4L subjects are classed together, as are G2M and G4M subjects. An analysis of variance for each of these classes of subjects allows us to partition the between-trial block variance into three components: a component due to a linear trend, a component due to responsiveness to fluctuations in the stooge's play, and a residual component.s Results of these analyses appear in Table 5 . Note that, while about half of the between-trial block sum of squares for G2M and G4M subjects is contained in the one-degree-of-freedom linear comparison, and more than half of between-trial-block variation for G2L and G4L subjects can be ascribed to a linear trend, very little variation is accounted for by the contrasts generated from the stooge's play. 5 . These linear and "responsiveness" comparisons are not strictly orthogonal.
However, prior to the experiment, the series of stooge choices was determined to be virtually uncorrelated with time. Hence, the linear and "responsiveness" comparisons [532] 
